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Case Digest: Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. no. 168338 (February 15, 2008)

 

Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. no. 168338 (February 15, 2008)

Summary of rule of law.

Any attempt to restrict press freedom and the right to free speech and free expression must be met with an examination so critical that only a danger that is clear and present would be allowed to curtail it.

Facts. The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections.

1.      On 5 June 2005, an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and a Comelec high-ranking official was released by Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye. It was audiotaped allegedly through wiretapping.

2.      Two versions of the tape were produced: one supposedly the complete version, and the other a spliced, “doctored” version, which would suggest that the President had instructed the Comelec official to manipulate the election results.

3.      On 7 June 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, Comelec Commissioner Garcilliano, and the late Senator Barbers.

4.      The next day, 8 June 2005, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD, and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. Gonzales also stated that persons possessing or airing the said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.

5.      9 June 2005, he ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of the tape” of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing the votes in the 2004 national elections.

6.      On 11 June 2005, NTC issued a press release warning TV networks and radio stations against broadcasting or telecasting of the alleged taped conversations. Broadcast/airing of such shall be just cause for suspension, revocation, and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations.

7.      On 14 June 2005, in a dialogue with KBP, NTC assured that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information. NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement.

8.      Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents Gonzales and NTC, “praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents.”

Issue.

Whether or not the exercises of authority of NTC abridge the freedom of expression and of the press. (Court decides to address only the most decisive one)

Petitioner’s argument

Respondent’s argument

The acts of the respondents violated the freedom of expression and of the press, and the right to information. The press statement constitutes impermissible prior restraint.

Broadcast media enjoys lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print; the warning was issued pursuant to NTC’s mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry.

 

Supplementing facts.

  1. On the procedural threshold of legal standing: ‘Petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having failed to allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy…” provided that he is not a member of the broadcast media. On the other hand, recipients of the press statements (the journalists themselves) neither intervened nor joined the petitioner in this action. They, as a group, issued a joint statement with respondent NTC that does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press.’
  2. Be that as it may, the Court chose to “brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all civil rights, the freedom of expression.”
  3. On reexamining the law on freedom of speech, of expression and of the press: “It is a cognate right codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.”
  4. On abstraction of free speech: “Constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free speech extends to speech and publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or informative.”
  5.  On the limits and restraints of free speech: “All speech is not treated the same. Some are subject to regulation. Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech (overbreadth, vagueness etc) have been applied differently to each category... This Court adheres to the clear and present danger doctrine.
  6. On anatomy of Restrictions: Prior restraint, Content-neutral, and content-based regulations: The determinations of the cases were always about whether the restraint was justified by the Constitution. 
  7. Respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test.

  

Ruling.

“In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.”

 Legal terms.

  1. Locus standi: a right to appear in a court or before any body on a given question.
  2. Parens patriae: the government, or any other authority, regarded as the legal protector of citizens unable to protect themselves.

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