Case Digest: Near v. Minnesota (argued: January 30 1931; decided June 1, 1931)

 

Near v. Minnesota (argued: January 30 1931; decided June 1, 1931)

Brief Fact Summary. A Minnesota law that “gagged” a periodical from publishing derogatory statements about local public officials was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The freedom of press is essential to the nature of a free state but that freedom may be restricted by the government in certain situations.

Facts.

The Saturday Press published attacks on local officials September 24 - November 19, 1927; (eight subsequent dates in October and November 1927) (what and when)

Jay M. Near (appellant and defendant) and Howard A. Guilford (defendant)

They published and circulated nine editions of the periodical which were “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” to chief of police, Frank W. Brunskill; special law enforcement officer, Charles A. Davis; Minneapolis mayor, George E. Leach; county attorney/prosecutor who is also the relator in this action, Floyd Olson; Melvin C. Passolt, the Minneapolis Tribune and Minneapolis Journal, the Jewish race and members of the Grand Jury of Hennepin County. (who were involved)

Minnesota officials obtained an injunction in order to abate the publishing of the Press newspaper under a state law that allowed this course of action. The state law authorized abatement, as a public nuisance, of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, or other periodical. A state court order abated the Press and enjoined the Defendants, publishers of the Press (Defendants), from publishing or circulating such “defamatory and scandalous” periodicals.

Issue. Whether a statute authorizing such proceedings is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed

Held. No. Judgment of the state court was reversed. The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not affect the requirement that the press has immunity from previous restraints when it deals with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with the constitutional privilege. Therefore, a statute authorizing such proceedings is not consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed and is thus, unconstitutional. The statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is published with good motives and for justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld, could lead to a complete system of censorship. Thus, the statute is a substantial infringement on the liberty of the press and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

Dissent. This statute does not operate as a previous restraint on publication within proper meaning of that phrase.

 

Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) in this case extended the presumption against prior restraint in the licensing context to judicial restraints as well.

Supplementing facts.

1. 327 pages of the record                     
2. Floyd Olson sought permanent injunction; received temporary injunction
3. Suit was based on a Minnesota statute; Chapter 285 of the session laws of Minnesota for 1925
4. It was a 5-4 decision
5. Newspaper’s disclosure resulted to a conviction of a local gangster
6. November 22, 1927 (beginning of action); upon verified complaint, order was made directing the defendants to show cause why temporary injunction should not issue; and forbid them from publishing, circulating or having in possession any edition of the periodical from September 24 - November 19, 1927, and from publishing, circulating or having in possession any future editions of The Saturday Press.
7. Robert McCormick, Chicago Tribune publisher, assisted Near to appeal to the US Supreme Court
8. Hughes (author) used incorporation doctrine (Gitlow v. New York); rights under the Bill of Rights to states under Fourteenth Amendment but ban on prior restraint are not categorical.
9. There are limitations upon immunity from previous restraint of the press but is not applicable here.
10. “In the present instance, the inquiry is as to the historic conception of the liberty of the press and whether the statute under review violates the essential attributes of that “liberty.” ”
11. “In accordance with familiar principles, the statute must be tested by its operation and effect.” Defendant has no standing to assert that the statute is invalid because it might be construed so as to violate the Constitution. Right is limited solely to the inquiry whether the effect of applying the statute is to deprive him of his liberty without due process of law.
12. Construes “liberty” in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to put upon the States a federal restriction that is without precedent
13. Guilford was assassinated three years after this decision.

Direction of the case. Trial court - state Supreme Court - United States Supreme Court

1. District Court overruled demurrer;
2. Certified question of constitutionality to the state Supreme Court;
3. State SC upheld both temporary injunction and permanent injunction;
4. SC sustained statute;
5. The case was remanded to district Court;
6. Conceded by appellee that Act thus held to be valid; over objection that it violated not only the state constitution but also the Fourteenth Amendment

Legal Terms.

1. Injunction: court order requiring a person to do or cease doing a specific action  
2. Ex-parte hearing: hearing done in the interest of one party/side only
3. Abatement: public nuisance
4. Demurred: to object
5. Demurrer: a pleading that challenges or objects to a pleading filed by an opposing party,  defense asserting that even if all the factual allegations in a complaint are true, they are insufficient to establish a valid cause of action
6. Plaintiff: the party who initiates a lawsuit
7. Defendant: a person or group against whom a criminal or civil action is brought