Case Digest: US vs. Bustos (G.R. No. L-12592)

US vs. Bustos (G.R. No. L-12592) 

Facts.

1. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Crossfield and O'Brien submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of considerable standing, including councilors and property owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the information as libelous.
2. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges. The judge of first instance found the first count (Polintan’s charge) not proved and counts 2 (Sunga’s) and 3 (Quiambao’s) established. In view of this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the Governor General that the respondent be removed from his position…”
3. The justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing.
4. Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on October 12, 1916.
5. New attorneys for the defense, coming into the case, after the handing down of the decision, file on December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by the then counsel for the defendants to the admission of Exhibit A consisting of the entire administrative proceedings. The trial court denied the motion.

 

Issue.

Whether or not the defendant-appellants are guilty of libel against Roman Punsalan

 

Held.

No, because qualified privilege.

Qualified privilege is prima facie (Latin for “at first sight”) which may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public official’s conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.

 

Ruling.

SC finds the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guarantees in our bill of rights. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio (or the prosecution referring to a case being prosecuted upon information signed by the prosecuting officer rather than upon a complaint signed by the complaining party).

 

Supplementing facts.

1. The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
2. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.