COMM
106 General Takeaways
- The Bill of Rights is a litany
of what the government cannot do. These rights are inherent to human
beings and called recognized rights; they are not given to us by the
government.
- But that is the general rule;
there are exceptions when the government can regulate speech. Freedom is
not absolute.
- Look for the law. How should
the Court rule? Look into whether the circumstance in the case is
constitutional or not. For the most part, focus on the unconstitutional
aspect of the cases.
- Aquino invalidated the 1973
Constitution.
- A revolution is always
unlawful. It is extraconstitutional (not authorized by the Constitution or
beyond its provisions)
- Protests intentionally blocking
traffic give the police the right to interfere.
- There are parameters for the
government to regulate, and the people to express themselves.
- All the other rights should
fall if you do not have the right to speak out.
- Look for the interest of the
government in the case. The burden is always on the government.
- Instances where the Court
justified prior restraint: war, obscene materials, speech tends to incite
violence or national security - but the danger must be clear and present.
- Fear must not be hypothetical.
If it is hypothetical, then there can be no prior restraint.
- Subsequent punishment is the
proper remedy and not prior restraint.
- There are symbolic speeches
(e.g. burning of flag, throwing paint, tearing of cedula, destruction of
property, covering Oble with cloth) but ask yourself if this protected
speech… and refer to no. 9
- Commercial speech < public
interest speech
- Misleading health claims can be
regulated. Subjective claims in advertisements (e.g. No.
1 trusted brand in the country, Pinakalami sa Carcar) are given leeway as long as
they are not destructive,
- There is a dichotomy between TV
and print. TV is accessible immediately to kids at home.
- Regarding ethical hackers -
nonetheless, without consent, you are still liable.
- Wiretapping is illegal but it
doesn't matter if it caught public interest (e.g. Garcia tapes, and NYT
case)
- You cannot ban spams but you
may ignore them.
- Factual claims are easier to
detect than opinions.
- There should be substantive
evil regarding clear and imminent danger… not vague
- You cannot censor
(publications) but you can sue for libel so that the press involved can
pay for damages = proper remedy
- Take note of recognized limitations.
Ethics, Morality and Law
Law. Formal rules regarding how we
behave as members of society. It has a narrower focus compared to morality and
ethics. (What we must or must not do)
Morality. Informal framework of values,
principles, beliefs of customs of living. Not often enforced by the state but
by social pressures to conform to moral norms. (What should one do)
Ethics. It is a process of reflection where your decisions are
shaped by your values, principles, and purpose rather than unthinking habits or
social conventions. (What is good, right or meaningful in our lives)
Contractualist Approach in Ethics. Sees Ethics as the attempt to
identify and justify principles that govern actions in general and actions
within professions and fields of endeavor. Universal agreement is not the goal of
Contractualism. It is tempered, however, by Cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitanism places great
importance on universal principles
of human rights, freedom and justice. The nationality, ethnicity, religion,
class, race, or gender of a person (or group) is morally irrelevant to whether
an individual is a member of humanity and comes under the protection of
cosmopolitan principles.
Legal Terms
1. Actual malice. Legal standard established by the
Supreme Court for libel cases to determine when public officials or public figures may recover damages in lawsuits
against the news media.
2. Certiorari. A writ or order by which a higher court reviews a decision
of a lower court.
3. Mandamus. A court order compelling someone to execute a duty that
they are legally obligated to complete.
4. Merit. This refers to a claim which has a valid basis, setting forth
sufficient facts from which the court could find a valid claim of deprivation of
a legal right.
5. Qualified Privilege. It is immunity (protection) from the penalty of a lawsuit,
usually a lawsuit for defamation (paninirang-puri), for acts committed in the
performance of a legal or moral duty and acts properly exercised and free from
malice. If malice can be
shown, qualified privilege is not a protection against defamation.
Malice is doing something with the intention to do something wrong. In a
defamation case, if someone is hurt by the actions of another, it’s usually not
intentional. But malice in a
defamation case would be knowing that the information is false but acting with
“reckless disregard” for the
truth.
6. Libel. A public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, ,
condition, status or circumstances tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who
is dead.
In the crime of libel, which
includes oral defamation, there is NO need for the prosecution to present
evidence of malice. It is enough that the alleged defamatory or libelous
statement be presented to the Court verbatim.
Freedom
of Expression
● It is available only insofar as it
is exercised for the discussion of matters affecting the public interest.
Element of Freedom of Expression
·
Freedom from prior restraint or
censorship
Article III, Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. |
The doctrine of freedom of speech was formulated
primarily for the protection of “core speech,” i.e. speech which communicates
political, social or religious ideas.
Cases protecting national security and public order
● In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the search, padlocking and sealing
of the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum by military authorities,
resulting in the discontinuance of publication of the newspapers, was held to
be prior restraint. It is in the nature of censorship abhorrent to the freedom
of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual
denial of Burgos et. al’s freedom to express themselves in print.
Legal basis: Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution
➔
Rule
of Law
➔
Warrants
must describe the items to be seized.
➔
“No warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause.”
➔
“Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed.
Prudential
Decree 885 as respondent’s argument is invalid; committing offense of
subversion
● Corro v.
Lising
was delivered in the same manner. The Supreme Court ruled that things to be seized
MUST be particularly described. Search warrants authorizing seizure of all
business transactions contravene the Bill of Rights as well (Stonehill v.
Diokno).
Legal basis: Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution
➔
Rule
of Law
➔
Warrants
must describe the items to be seized.
➔
No warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause.
➔ “Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in the
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Mere
generalization will not suffice”
➔
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by PD
1385; Inciting acts of sedition
● In New York Times v. United States, the Court held that prohibition of
“prior restraint” is NOT absolute, although any system of prior restraint comes
to court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality, with which
the government did NOT overcome in the case at bar such that: (1) The First
Amendment leaves no room for government restraint on the press; (2) There was
also NO statute that gave the government the power to ask the Court to stop the
publication of materials; (3) There was NO proof provided by the government
that severe consequences may happen, and; (4) the documents will NOT cause irreparable
danger to the public.
Legal basis: First Amendment
➔
Congress
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting its free
exercise
➔
It
protects freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and the right to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
➔
Press
should be left free to publish news whatever the source is, without censorship,
injunctions, and prior restraints.
● In Near v. Minnesota, the exceptions to the prohibition
of prior restraint is enumerated by the Court. The statute authorizing such
proceedings is NOT consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press
and is therefore unconstitutional. The statute CANNOT be justified by reason of
fact that the “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” published matter is TRUE,
and is published with GOOD MOTIVES AND FOR JUSTIFIABLE ENDS.
Legal basis: Fourteenth Amendment
● The
Minnesotan statute violates the fourth amendment because it infringes on the
liberty of the press and free speech.
➔ Public Nuisance Law/Minnesota
Law/Minnesota Gag Law
➔ Chapter 285 of the
Session Laws of Minnesota for the year 1925.
➔ In the business of
regularly and customarily producing, publishing, etc., an obscene, lewd and
lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other periodical OR malicious, scandalous,
and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical is guilty of a nuisance,
and authorizes suits, in the name of the State
However, in some cases like…
●
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, the Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television (BRMPT) has the authority to review the petitioner's
television program. But the Board acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
gave an “X-rating” to the TV program on the ground of “attacks against another
religion.” Such a classification can be justified only if there is a showing
that the TV program would create a clear and present danger of an evil which
the State ought to prevent. The episodes in question are protected under Art.
III, Section 4 of the 1987 Consti. Likewise, Section 3 (c) of the PD 1986 suppresses the petitioner’s
freedom of speech and interferes with the right to free exercise of religion.
“Attacks against other religions” is NOT among the grounds as well to justify
an order prohibiting the broadcast of the program.
- PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code
➔
MTRCB
is under the Office of the President-- mandated to regulate and classify
movies, television programs, related publicly materials and/or promotional
materials.
- Section 3 of PD 1986
➔
Gives
Board the power to screen, review and examine all television programs.
➔
It
also has the power to approve, delete, and/or prohibit the exhibition and/or
television broadcast of television programs.
- Legal basis: Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution
➔
Constitutional
guarantee of free speech and expression.
➔
“No
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances."
- Article 3, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution
➔
No
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
“Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.”
● In Gonzales v. Comelec, the Court upheld the validity of
the law which prohibited, EXCEPT during the prescribed election period, the
making of speeches, announcements or commentaries for or against the election
of any party or candidate for public office.
- Republic Act No. 4880 CANNOT be held unconstitutional (Revised
Election Code)
➔
Section 50-A: early nominations of candidates for elective public
offices.
➔
Section 50-B: early election campaigns or partisan political
activities
➔
Prohibiting
the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity.
➔
Has
a clear and present danger doctrine, there being substantive evil in elections
➔
Exercise
of police power legislation in the state.
- Legal basis: Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution
➔
Constitutional
guarantee of free speech and expression; and,
- Constitutional Provision
➔
No treaty or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of
the Supreme Court.
- cited Cabansag v. Fernandez
two (2) tests
- Clear and present danger rule: the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
high before the utterance can be punished. The “danger” must not only be
clear but also present. The danger must not only be probable but very
likely inevitable.
➔
Dangerous
tendency rule: the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has the right to prevent, then such
words are punishable.” It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts
of force, violence or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such
acts be advocated in general terms.
➔
The governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
➔
The incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
·
In United States v. O’Brien,
·
Legal basis: Government regulation;
justified if:
- it is within the
constitutional power of the government;
- It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
- The governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
- The incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
·
1965 Amendment under Section
462(b)(3) of Universal Military Training and Service Act/ Selective Service
Act.
·
“The act of burning a draft card does not implicate a
substantial speech interest”- not protected by the First Amendment.
·
The governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
·
The incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.
·
Friedman v. Rogers
·
Legal basis: Commercial speech
Texas Optometry Act
➔
5.13(d): prohibited practice of optometry under trade names
(constitutional)
➔
S2.02: requires that four of the six members of the Texas
Optometry Board which regulates the practice of Optometry in the State, be
members of the Texas Optometry Association, the professional organization of
optometrists. (constitutional)
·
MTRCB v. ABS-CBN (Legarda)
·
Legal basis: Presidential Decree No. 1986 (Created
MTRCB under President Marcos)
➔
Board is given the power to screen, review and
examine all television programs.
➔
It
also has the power to approve, delete, and/or prohibit the exhibition and/or
television broadcast of television programs.
➔
Section 7: Unauthorized
showing or exhibition any motion picture, tv program or publicly material. In the exception of: motion pictures, television programs or
publicity material imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or
its departments and agencies, and newsreels.
➔
Section 3 Chapter 3: All mentioned
materials shall be subject to review by the board.
➔
Section 7 Chapter 4: Requirement for prior review.
➔
P.D. 1986 – it is a public
affairs program, not news reel.
·
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
·
In ABS-CBN v. Comelec, the Comelec banned “exit polls'' in the exercise of its
authority to regulate the holders of media franchises during the election
period. It contends that “an exit poll
has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting
interviewees....” However, the Court said that exit polls constitute an essential part of the freedoms of
speech and of the press. Hence,
the Comelec CANNOT ban totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly
and credible elections. The ban does NOT satisfy the clear and
present danger rule because the evils envisioned are MERELY SPECULATIVE.
·
Legal basis: Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution
➔
Constitutional
principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots.
·
Art. III, Section 4.
·
Government regulation from US v. O’Brien
·
Cabansag
v. Fernandez 2 theoretical tests
➔
Clear and present danger rule: the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence high before the
utterance can be punished. The “danger” must not only be clear but also
present. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
➔
Dangerous tendency rule: the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has the right to prevent, then such words are
punishable.” It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms.
·
Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. Francis Theonen
- Legal basis: Article 19 of the Civil Code
➔
To
"act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.”
- “Libel is NOT protected speech.”
- For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be
met:
➔
The
allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another
➔
publication of the charge
➔
identity of the person defamed
➔
existence of malice.
- An allegation is considered
defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or
put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is
dead
- To satisfy the element of
identifiability
➔
It must be shown that at least a third person
or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory
statement.
➔
Malice
or ill will must be present
- Doctrine of privileged communication
➔
"A
privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly
Privileged.
Disini v. Secretary of Justice
- Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012 (RA 10175)
➔
Section 4(a)(1): calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act(constitutional)
➔
Section 4(a)(3): simply punishes what essentially is a
form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things
that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document,
or electronic data message.(constitutional)
➔
Section 4(b)(3): what this section regulates are specific
actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data
of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal data. (constitutional)
➔
Section 4(c)(1): The law actually seeks to punish cyber
prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration.
(constitutional)
➔
Section 4(c)(2): merely expands the scope of the
Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in
cyberspace. (constitutional)
➔
Section
4(c)(3): restricted freedom of expression by prohibiting the
unsolicited transmission of commercial communications, such as spam. The
Supreme Court held that spams are a category of commercial
speech(unconstitutional)
➔
Section 5(Aiding and Abetting) in
relation to 4(c)(4): Section
5 renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes.
It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
protected expression.(unconstitutional)
➔
Section
12: violated the right to privacy because it lacked sufficient
specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. Because
Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private communications (unconstitutional)
➔
Section
19(Restricting or Blocking to Computer Data): provides that
“When a computer data is prima facie
found to be in violation of
the provisions of this Act, the Department of Justice shall issue an order to
restrict or block access to such computer data.” It gives the government the
authority to restrict or block access to computer data without a judicial
warrant. It, thus, violated the rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. (unconstitutional)
·
GMA v. COMELEC
- Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution)
➔
limits the broadcast and radio advertisements
of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an
aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty
(180) minutes, respectively. (unconstitutional)
- Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006
➔
candidate
is entitled to the number of minutes "per station” (May 14, 2007 and May
10, 2010)
3.
Legal basis: Art. III, Section 4
●
Chavez v. Gonzales
●
Legal basis: Anti-Wiretapping Act
Cases that
tackles access to information, laws and procedures
Art. III, Section 4 1987 Constitution:
Right
of access to information
Recognized
Limitations:
- National security matters and
intelligence information;
- Trade secrets and banking transactions;
- Criminal matters;
- Other confidential information
● In Garcia vs. Board of Investments, the Court emphasized that Article
81 provides for disclosure “on the orders of a court of competent
jurisdiction”. The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of
the application, amended application, and supporting documents filed with the
BOI under Article 81, with certain exceptions.
● However, despite the right to access
information, “the Constitution does NOT open every door to any and all
information” because “the law may exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny.” Excluded from this right are “trade
secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial information of the
applicant Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, and matters affecting national
security.”
●
Legal basis:
Art. III. Section 7.
“The
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized.”
·
Baldoza v. Dimaano
·
In Baldoza v. Judge Dimaano, the respondent allowed the petitioner to open and
view the docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision.
It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent
were unreasonable. The Constitution expressly recognizes that the people are
entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly
granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution
is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy.
·
Legal basis:
Art. III. Section 7.
“The
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized.”
·
Neri v. Senate
- Legal basis: Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly unpublished rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”
Violated because: their
inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure," and they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and
precipitately.
- Executive privilege
➔
the
power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential (typical)
and non-delegable presidential power
➔
the "doctrine of operational
proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
➔
The
President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized
interest; and in balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing
interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information
3. Art.
III. Section 7.
“The
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized.”
Chavez v. PCGG
- “Petition is granted on the
grounds that the General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28,
1993, which PCGG and the Marcos’ heirs entered into are NULL AND VOID for
being contrary to law and the Constitution”
- Legal basis: Section 7, Article III of the Constitution
➔
asserts
that the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
- Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
➔
confers
upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.)
Cases
about social order and freedom of expression
·
Navarro v. City Mayor Villegas
- In Navarro v. Villegas, Court sustained respondent
mayor's act of refusing to issue a permit enabling students to hold a
public rally. As stated in (legal basis) Primicias v. Fuguso, he possesses reasonable discretion to determine the public place
to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by
others and provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and
order.
- The right to freedom of assembly while not unlimited is entitled to
be accorded the utmost deference and respect.
- “A law subjecting the exercise
of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without
narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority, is unconstitutional”
·
Miller v. California
- California Penal Code
- The Court reaffirms the (legal basis) Roth v. United
States holding that obscene material is not protected by the First
Amendment.
- To prove obscenity, it must be
affirmatively established that the material is "utterly without redeeming
social value.”
- Miller Test
➔
whether
"the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest
➔
whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law
➔
whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
- One cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at
least five members of the Court, applying inevitably obscure standards,
have pronounced it so.
- The work is
considered obscene only if all three conditions are satisfied.
- The Courts should not apply a
national standard but the standard of the
community in which the material is being
tested.
- In the case at bar, the Supreme
Court (a) reaffirmed the Roth holding that obscene material is NOT protected by the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution; (b) held that such material can be
regulated by the States, subject to specific safeguards, without a showing
that the material is “utterly without
redeeming social value, and; (c) held that obscenity is to be determined “contemporary
community standards.” Court noted that each state should be free, through
state statute, to construct obscenity laws that are representative of
their communities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that the
publication at issue in this case had NO
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
● In Gonzales v. Katigbak, the petitioner questioned the classification
of the movie “Kapit sa Patalim” as “For Adults Only” by the MTRCB and was
suggested to have certain portions cut/deleted. The petition was dismissed because
the Board did NOT commit grave abuse of discretion (and there was NOT enough
votes for a ruling that there was really grave abuse).
●
Legal basis: “Freedom
of speech is not absolute”
Cases about
defamation and libel
·
Borjal v. Court of Appeals
- Requisites for libel suit:
➔
It
must be shown that at least a third person or a stranger was able to identify
him as the object of the defamatory statement.
➔
Malice or ill will must be present
- Legal basis: Doctrine of Fair Comment:
➔
while
in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved,
and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity,
it is not necessarily actionable.
➔
In
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on
a false supposition.
➔
the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.
- Malice can be presumed from
defamatory words, the
privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of
malice.
➔
be
considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been
written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless
disregard of whether they are false or not
➔
"Reckless
disregard of what is false or not" means that the defendant entertains
serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, or that he possesses a high
degree of awareness of their probable falsity.
- In US v. Bustos, Bustos and several people
sent complaint letters via counsel against Justice of Peace Roman
Punsalan, who charged them with libel. Bustos and the others were
acquitted. The guarantees
of free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct. Also, Qualified Privilege is prima facie (Latin for “at
first sight”) which may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in
complaints made in good faith against a public official’s conduct having a
duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the
protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it was in good
faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
- Legal basis: Qualified privilege
➔
prima
facie (Latin for “at first sight”) which may be lost by proof of malice.
➔
apparent
in complaints made in good faith against a public official’s conduct having a
duty in the matter.
➔
Even
if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may cover
the individual given that it was in good faith.
➔
there
must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
➔
rests
upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an
incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed
and malignant slanderer
Test
of valid governmental interference (criteria in determining the liability of the individual for
ideas he expressed)
● Clear and present danger rule
(provided in Cabansag
v. Fernandez)
- When words are used in such circumstance and of such nature as to create a
clear and present danger that will bring about the substantive evil that the
State has a right to prevent - (As formulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v.
United States); serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or
public welfare. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its
imminence. The time element cannot be
ignored. Nor does it suffice if such
danger be only probable.
Clear - causal connection with the danger
of the substantive evil arising from the utterance;
Present – time element; imminent and immediate danger (the danger must NOT ONLY be
probable but ALSO inevitable). (Gonzales v.
Comelec)
More about Libel
● The general rule for a speech to be considered
libelous or defamatory is: Libel = falsity + actual malice (uttered in full
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard)
● Exemption:
When the subject of the supposed libelous or defamatory material is a public
officer.
Defamatory words may be uttered against them and not be considered libelous.
The reason is that 1) they asked for it (“they voluntarily thrust themselves
into the public eye and therefore should not be thin-skinned”); 2) it’s a
matter of public interest; and 3) public figures have the opportunity and
resources to rebut whatever is said against them. (Policarpio v. Manila Times);
● Moreover, criticism of official
conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is
effective criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations. Presence
of clear and present danger of substantive evil must be proved. Actual Malice
needs to be proved if a public official wants to recover damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct.
Other
Doctrines
- Overbreadth doctrine.
A proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that
unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
freedoms. Put differently, an overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts
even constitutionally-protected rights.
- Clear
and Present Danger Rule. This rule rests on the premise that
speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the
speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.
As explained in Chavez v. Gonzales, a content-based regulation is
evaluated using the clear and present danger rule, while courts
will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.
- Content-based Restraint on Freedom of Speech. As explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is
evaluated using the clear and present danger rule. A content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the
restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of
the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed
with.
- Content neutral regulation - i.e., merely concerned with
the incidents of speech, or one that merely controls the time, place, or
manner, and under well[-]defined standards. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to
intermediate scrutiny.
- Executive Privilege. It is
the power of
the President to
withhold certain types of
information from the
public, the courts, and the
Congress. Art. VI Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and
be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
- Doctrine
of privileged communications.
It rests upon public policy, “which
looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an
incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the
evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.” (Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma)
- Doctrine of Fair Comment
/ Borjal Doctrine. Fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense
in an action for libel or slander. It means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed
innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation
is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of
opinion, based on established facts, it is immaterial that the opinion
happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably inferred from the
facts. (Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1)
Resource: https://phlegaldoctrines.blogspot.com/ ; http://ulandi-notes.blogspot.com/2014/06/definitions-and-doctrines-in-political.html
Sample question:
How do the Supreme Court decisions in New York Times v. United
States, and United States v. O’Brien help define the meaning of “the freedom of
speech and of the press”? Discuss. Do you agree or disagree with the
outcome of these cases? Why?
How (in what way) do the Supreme Court decisions in New
York Times v. United States, and United States v. O’Brien help define
the meaning of “the freedom of speech and of the press”? Discuss. Do you agree or disagree (opinion) with the outcome of these cases?
Why? (reason)
Answers:
How and Discuss
The New York Times decision established the doctrine that any system of prior
restraints on expression imposed by the government carries
it with a heavy presumption that is not invalid. Essentially it places a
premium on freedom of speech and of the press over any form of censorship
– like when a message will likely cause a grave and irreparable danger to the
public when published. In this case the publication of a classified government
document (Pentagon papers) was allowed because the
government failed to overcome said heavy presumption.
How and Discuss
The O’Brien decision affirmed the criminal conviction of a person who
symbolically burned his draft card under a federal law disallowing such
alteration. This decision shows that freedom of
expression is not absolute. Here, it was justified that it is within power
of the government protect the sanctity of an instrument
where the prohibition is unrelated to freedom of speech but related to the protection of an important government interest. If
there is any suppression of expression, it was
merely incidental.
Opinion and Reason
I don’t exactly agree with the outcome of the O’Brien
decision because it upheld a system of subsequent punishment for a clearly
symbolic speech – and essential tool of freedom of expression – in favor of a
draft card the destruction of which does not really
pose a clear and present danger of substantive evil to society, following the
standards set by the New York Times decision which
I full conform to. An enlightened citizenry
is worth the risk of sacrificing certain government interests in the altar of
democracy.
Shorter answer:
The New York Times decision places a premium on freedom of speech and of the press over any form of censorship by requiring a heavy
presumption that said prior restraint is not invalid . Thus, the
publication of a secret government document was allowed
because the government failed to overcome said heavy presumption. The
O’Brien decision, on the other hand, set the limit on
freedom of expression by upholding the validity of a law which prohibits the
alteration of the draft card in favor of protecting
an important government interest, and where suppression of expression
was merely incidental.
I disagree with the outcome of the
O’Brien decision because it is a subsequent punishment against the destruction
of a draft card - a form of symbolic speech which does
not pose a clear and present danger of substantive evil to society, following the standards
set by the New York Times decision which I fully
conform to. An enlightened citizenry is worth
the risk of sacrificing certain government interests in the altar of democracy.
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